Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

State of Utah v. Derrick Wade Gardner : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Debra M. Nelson; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Counsel for Appellant.
Jeffrey S. Gray; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Nathaniel
Sanders; Salt Lake District Attorney's Office; Counsel for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Gardner, No. 20090782 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1889

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case No. 20090782
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

DERRICK WADE GARDNER,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from convictions for possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, and possession
of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in the Third
Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Paul G. Maughan presiding
(5852)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180

JEFFREY S.GRAY

M. NELSON
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DEBRA

Counsel for Appellant

NATHANIEL SANDERS
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office
Counsel for Appellee

Oral Argument Requested

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Case No. 20090782
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.
DERRICK WADE GARDNER,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from convictions for possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, and possession
of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in the Third
Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Paul G. Maughan presiding
(5852)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L, SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180

JEFFREY S.GRAY

M. NELSON
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DEBRA

Counsel for Appellant

NATHANIEL SANDERS
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office
Counsel for Appellee

Oral Argument Requested

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1
.

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT

9

I.

THE WEAPONS FRISK OF DEFENDANT'S PERSON WAS
LAWFUL
A. The weapons frisk of Defendant was justifed under Terry v.
Ohio

9

10

1. The initial stop was lawful

10

2. The deputy reasonably suspected that Defendant was
armed and dangerous

10

B. The weapons frisk was conducted pursuant to Defendant's
voluntary consent

16

1. Defendant's consent to the weapons frisk was voluntarily
given

16

2. Defendant's consent was not obtained by police
exploitation of a prior illegality

20

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IL TESTIMONY THAT CERTAIN EVIDENCE WAS INDICATIVE OF
DISTRIBUTION WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED

21

1. The prosecutor was exempt from providing formal notice of
expert testimony under subsection (6) of the expert
notification statute

23

2. The prosecutor was exempt from providing formal notice of
expert testimony under subsection (5) of the expert
notification statute

25

CONCLUSION
ADDENDA
Addendum A: Constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules
Addendum B: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-u-may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES

Arizona v. Gant, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009)
Arizona v. Johnson, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 781 (2009)

9
passim

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)

16

Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)

16

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

9,16,17
passim

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002)

11

United States v. Buckner, 179 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 1999)

14

United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1997)

19

United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761 (10th Cir. 1999)

19

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)

9

United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2000)

19

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)

13

STATE CASES

People v. Anthony, 761 N.E.2d 1188 (111. 2001)
State v. Lamond, 2003 UT App 101, 68 P.3d 1043

19, 20
14

State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18,229 P.3d 650

11,12,13

State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,103 P.3d 699

2

State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650

16,17

State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,100 P.3d 1222

1

State v. McCloud, 2005 UT App 466,126 P.3d 775

2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-iii-

State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49,147 P.3d 1176
State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, 76 P.3d 1159

3
22

State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9,227 P.3d 1251

17,18

State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,78 P.3d 590

11,15

State v. Yazzie, 2005 UT App 261,116 P.3d 969

10

STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (West 2004)

passim

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (West 2009)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-ivMachine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

Case No. 20090782
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

DERRICK WADE GARDNER,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant, Derrick Wade Gardner, appeals from convictions for
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West Supp. 2007), and
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the deputy conduct a lawful weapons frisk of defendant?

Standard of Review. A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is a
mixed question of fact and law. The court's factual findings are reviewed for
clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, ]f 11, 100 P.3d 1222. Its legal
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conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its
application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,111,103
P.3d699.
2. Did the prosecutor fail to comply with the notice requirements of Utah
Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (West 2004)?
Standard of Review. "This court reviews a district court's ruling on a
mistrial motion for an abuse of discretion." State v. McCloud, 2005 UT App 466,
1 9,126 P.3d 775.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
The following provisions relevant to this appeal are reproduced in
Addendum A: U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Gardner was charged with (1) possession of methamphetamine with
intent to distribute, a second degree felony, and (2) possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R.l-2. A preliminary hearing was held
on August 21,2008 and Gardner was bound over for trial. See R.23,42,186.l
Motion to suppress evidencefrom search. Gardner moved to suppress the
evidence, arguing that the search of his person for weapons violated the Fourth

1

See discussion, infra, at 25-26.
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Amendment. R.23-30. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court
denied the motion and entered corresponding findings of fact and conclusions
of law. R.42-43,48A-50; R.186 (Addendum B).
Motion in limine to exclude testimony regarding distribution.

On the

morning of trial, Gardner's counsel moved to exclude testimony from the
sheriffs deputies "relating to the distribution of drugs." R.187:12. He claimed
that it was expert testimony under State v. Roihlisberger, 2006 UT 49,147 P.3d
1176, and advised the court that he "ha[d]n't received any notice from the State
that their officers are going . . . to be called as experts to testify about those
things." R.187:12. He argued that "absent that notice, they aren't experts and
can't testify about it." R.187: 12. The prosecutor argued that the deputies'
testimony on distribution did not constitute expert testimony. R.187:12-13. The
trial court agreed, but said that it would "look at this [issue] further" during
trial. R.187:13-14.
Deputies Blake Day and Kevin Barrett thereafter testified to several
factors that, based on their experience and training, were indicative of
distribution. They testified that the quantity of methamphetamine found on
Gardner "generally would be broken up into smaller baggies" for sale, R.187:7576, 80, 138; that the "multiple quantities of baggies" and $666 in cash were
indicative of distribution, R.187: 76; that the piece of paper with the financial
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information of different people and/or businesses was significant because users
often finance their drug problem by "counterfeit[ing] checks and/or enter[ing]
someone's account information to gain funds/' R.187: 76, 131-32; and that
Gardner and the driver "fit the scenario" of "two people working together to
distribute drugs," where "the passenger holds the drugs and does the dealing
while the driver drives them to the meet spots," R.187:101.
Defense counsel objected to the deputies' testimony, but the trial court
denied the objections. See R.187: 75-76,80-81,101,131-32,139-40. Counsel also
moved for a mistrial, but that too was denied. R.187:139,160-64,175. At the
close of all the evidence, however, the trial court instructed the jury to
"disregard" Deputy Barrett's testimony regarding the significance of the large
quantity of methamphetamine. R.187:169-75,181. Although the court was "still
of the opinion" that it correctly denied the objections, it gave the instruction "in
an abundance of caution." R.187:169-75. The court explained to the jury that
they were "to determine whether or not the State is proving a distribution case"
and that Deputy Barrett's "opinion... on that issue is not relevant." R.187:181.
Conviction, sentence, and appeal. Following the one-day trial, a jury
found Gardner guilty of both counts as charged. R.153,158-62; R.187:199. He
was sentenced to a suspended prison term of one-to-fifteen years, a concurrent
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jail term of 180 days with credit for time served, and placed on supervised
probation for 36 months. R.169-71. He timely appealed. R.177-78.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
While working patrol, Deputy Blake Day stopped a green Hyundai for a
cracked windshield and failing to signal. R.186:5; R.187:62-63. Gardner was the
lone passenger in the car. R.187:65-66. A computer check of the driver revealed
that he had several outstanding warrants for his arrest and was classified as a
safety risk for concealed weapons, mental instability, and drug use. R.186:5;
R.187:67. Day radioed for backup and K-9 Deputy Kevin Barrett arrived soon
after.

R.186:5-6; R.187:67,140-41. Day met with Barrett at Barrett's patrol

vehicle, advised him of the situation, and the two then returned to the stopped
car.

R.186:12. Deputy Day asked the driver if he had any weapons or

contraband in the vehicle and the driver responded that he had a knife or knives
in the car. R.186:6,8-9,12; R.187:68,117-18. Deputy Day then directed the driver
to exit the car and proceeded to arrest him on the warrants. R.186:5-6; R.187:69.
While Day was dealing with the driver, Deputy Barrett watched Gardner
from the passenger side of the car. R.186:12-13. When he first saw Gardner,
Gardner's "hands . . . were between his legs on the seat/7 he was "very
nervous/' and "he kept shuffling his hands underneath his legs and then
bringing them out and making a lot of movements with his hands." R.186:12;

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

R 1 87:11 8,1 11 42 I '1 lis was "a danger sign" for Deputy Barrett, suggesting that
Gardner "might be reaching for a w eapon." R.l8

M s Wher i he 1 hen informed

Gardner that iK drixor was being arrested and the vehicle impounded,
( u.nmer's nervon* tvh<-,\ u- increased. R.l 86:1 3 1 1; R 1 87:11 8.'

and [the presence of] an u n k n o w n knife in an u n k n o w n location;" Deputy
Barrett "became concerned lhal ihe knife might be with Mr. Gardner."
R.186:14 1 7 1 8. As a re^uii, r.e requested >w Gardner exit the vehicle ai"u; asiv,.;
n
(in

: i;>

•

i \ <; - < )i L 1: tin i

R 1 86:1 I • R 1 81: :

-

- K said that he d i d not, D e p u t y Barrett asked h i m "if h e m i n d e d if [he]

gave h i m a Terry frisk." R.186:14; R.187:70-71. Iii response, G a r d n e r "turned
around and raised his arms out, and Deputy Barrett proceeded to pat him
down ' R 1 8;; • / 1 ; R.l 86:1 - 1 1 5,1 9 20
1

'

~-

•' " •

",

• •

Depi it ) Barret! saw a glass pipe IA it'll w\ lite residi le

"poking uui oi die top of the [open] pocket" of Gardner's pants. R.187:120-21;
R.186:15 -1 6. Recognizing it as "a pipe commoi ily i lsed to smoke narcoti.es,"
Deputy Barrett pulled ,; ^.^t o: i^iUJiKi s pants pocket and a.sked w hat was
ii iside It: t..e p »ipe.

R.l 81'/ : / :"1 ,1 21 ; R.l 86:1 6

Gardi ter tol i 1 iin t 1:1 ic i/i • ii • vas

methamphetamine. R.186:16; R.187:122.
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Deputy Barrett placed Gardner under arrest and conducted a search of his
person incident to arrest. R.187:122,136. He found two small, green Ziploc bags
of cocaine, a sandwich bag containing three more small, green Ziploc bags, a
cellophane cigarette wrapper containing ten Seroquel tablets, $666 in cash, an
iPod, and a sandwich bag containing miscellaneous items, including a piece of
paper that had written on it the names, addresses, and account numbers
(including expiration dates) of two individuals and a business. R.187:71-72,12224,128-33,139,143,179-80; SE8. He also found a baggie containing a large
quantity of methamphetamine in Gardner's handcuffed hands, which Gardner
admitted to retrieving from his back pocket. R.187:127-28,138.
After waiving his Miranda rights, Gardner claimed ownership of the cash,
but said he was holding the drugs for the driver in exchange for
methamphetamine. R.187:72-73,135-36. Deputy Barrett suggested to Gardner
that he was "playing a drug deal for the driver." R.187:136. Gardner did not
deny the accusation, but said nothing. R.187:136.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Weapons frisk. The search of Gardner's person was justified as a
protective frisk for weapons under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The driver of
the car had outstanding warrants and was a known safety risk. Deputy Barrett
heard the driver indicate that there was a knife or knives in the car but its
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location was unknown. And when Deputy Barrett first saw Gardner, his hands
"were between his legs on the seat/7 Gardner appeared very nervous and he
"kept shuffling his hands underneath his legs and then bringing them 01it"
Moreover, this bel lavioi ii lcreased w 1 t„ei it„1 old 1 he; dri\ er w asbeii igarresl edai tcl,
1 «

,

»* ••* > • : - ' 'K

:\

iggested that

Gardner m a y be armed with the knife referenced b y the driver was reasonable
and justified the frisk.
11i.,e frisk was also justified pursuant to Gardner's consent. Deputy Barrett
asked Gardner "if h e n 1.I.1 t,,ded ' i f he gavel tin 1, a 7 et ;• 1/frisk Ii L response (JrirdiuT
simply turned around and raised his arms. Although Gardner said nothing, his
actions signaled unequivocal consent. Moreover, nothing in the circumstances
suggested that the consent w a s the product of duress or coercion. There was no
clain 1, of a„i ltl torit\ , 1 to trickery , a„i i,, d, 1 10 e:; ;1 ribitioi 1, c f f :)i :e
II Expert notice

" 1 1 lis C01 irt 1 leed 1 i„.ol • iecide v\ hel 1 i„ei * the depi ill ies'

testimony relating to distribution constituted expert testimon). Assuming,
arguendo, that it was, pursuant 1 o subsections (5) and (6) of the expert
notificatioi 1 statute, the State was not required,, to give formal 1 totice :>f tl leir
Irstimoi'N

ii|"lrr

>IIKPI

lion ('')

^nltuicnt nolm' W.IS pr.<\id<.l it Hu*

preliminary hearing. And under subsection (6), sufficient notice was provided
for through general discovery.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE WEAPONS FRISK OF DEFENDANTS PERSON WAS
LAWFUL
Gardner moved to suppress the evidence seized from his person, arguing
that the officer's frisk for weapons violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See
R.23-30. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the initial weapons search
was justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and pursuant to Gardner's
consent. R.49-50. This Court should affirm.
* **

"[W]henever practicable/7 police officers must"obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure/' Terry, 392
U.S. at 20.

Searches conducted without a warrant "are presumptively

unreasonable, though the [Supreme] Court has recognized a few limited
exceptions to this general rule." United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984);
accord Arizona v. Gant, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1710,1716 (2009). Those exceptions
include "a search that is conducted pursuant to consent," Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,219 (1973), and "a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing" for weapons when there is reason to believe a suspect is armed and
dangerous, Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31. The challenged search in this case was
justified under both exceptions.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

"'""! ' I '1 ie weapons frisk of Defendant was justifed under Terry v.
OhirA it-nu I risk for weapons is "constitutionally permissible" it IK o
coi iditions are satisfied: (1 ) 1 1 leii i\ estigatory stop mi i si be law ft il " ai i :i (2) 1 1 te
police officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed aiid
dangerous," Arm ma v. Johnson,

"~

. P O S . O . 781 ,784(2009). The

weapons frisk of Gardner satisfied both conditions.
1

"Illllln," i n i l i i i l «siii(» \\ii'i

Li< 111 ill.

The Supreme Court in Johnson explained that "in a traffic-stop setting, the
first Terry condition—a lawful investigatory stop
f

is mot whenever it is lawful

or poll* r to vU'iuin an automobiu ,*iu: its occupants pending mqiri
'

•:

'\ S

• • '

- . - * • ,

.

i^ -

to believe any occupant of the vehicle ib inv olvcu n; v.i;nu*iai a^a\ r v .

T
.

i
i: - e

lu. in

this case, Deputy Day's observations that the1 driver failed to signal when
turning (and that the ca t had a UCK keu \ indshield) provided a

w ^ » JM^ K-r

il 1 t,c ;stoi > St >t *Siah \v \ i izzit " .21305 1 J I \ j : j > 261 , 1 f : 1 1 6 P 3- 1969 Ga rd i u ii 1 i, is
not argued otherwise. See Aplt. Brf. at 13-21.
2

The deputy reasonably suspected that Defendant was armed
and dangerous.

"""" I o ji isti fy a patdo\ v i i off 1: te drh er or a passenger di iring a 1 i affic stop,
. . . the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the
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frisk is armed and dangerous/' Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 784; accord State v. Baker,
2010 UT 18, \ 41,229 P.3d 650. Accordingly, "the officer must be able to point to
specific facts which, considered with rational inferences from those facts/'
support his or her suspicions. State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, \ 14, 78 P.3d 590.
"The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue
is whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." Terry,
392 U.S. at 27.
When evaluating the propriety of a Terry frisk, the reviewing court
employs an objective test, "view[ing] the articulable facts in their totality and
avoid [ing] the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation from
each other." Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 14. Although an officer's hunch is not
sufficient to justify a frisk, "due weight must be given . . . to the specific
reasonable inferences which [the officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. As recognized in Warren, "this
process allows officers to draw upon their own experience and training to make
determinations based on the cumulative facts before them that may elude an
untrained person." Warren, 2003 UT 36, \ 14 (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). Based on the totality of the circumstances present in this

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

:

case I>

* • " ^ * "w v*\\"U .« ,', if r- lvhe' i at his safety or that of others

was in danger.'' I'crry, 592 U.S. at 1\.
Gardner's companion, who was driving the car, had outstanding warrants
and was a known safety risk for carrying weapons, mei il alii istal: ilit) ai i. i d r u g
use See R 1 87:67. Depi lty Barrel 1 • I: leard 1 1 le d ri \ • ei I ell Depi it) Day 1 lia/l tl itei e
was a knife or knives in the car. R.186:18; R187:68,117 18. And w hen he
initially saw Gardner sitting in the front passenger seat, Gardner's hands "were
betweer hi^ lor^ on the seat, " Gardner appeared "very nervous, and 1 ie kept
:

i-fiiii;

l

i '-. . ••
•• ^

sigr

r: Ins \vy}s dinl linn hi iri*»111^\ llu-iiu ut ami i n a h n g
• .mils ' K.I87: 118,141-42. This was a "danger

*<•• Deputy Barrett as "someone w h o might be reaching for a weapon."

R.187:142. Then, w h e n Deputy Barrett informed Gardner that the driver w a s
being arrestee ..*..,! Liu- ^ u t jnpou; ..u ,;, ^. .ui\;jier's nervous beha\ ior increased.
•* « •

•

•:

-.;•-*

' ! : • » « 'et t's belief 1 hat"tl leki u fe

might be with Mr. Gardner, the passenger." R.186:14.
Gardner argues that this case is controlled by State v. Bi iker, where the
Utah Supreme v. .mn iield that, despite finding multiple knives in the vehicle, an
officer's 7 ern f frisk of a passei iger w as i 10I si lpported h} reasonable suspicioi it.
See Baker, 2010 UT 18, f f 41-56. But two important factual differences separate
the two cases and compel a different result here. First, the knives identified by
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the occupants in Baker were voluntarily surrendered to the officers. See id. at Iff
42-43. In contrast, the knife or knives identified by the driver here remained in
an "unknown location/' even as Gardner "shuffl[ed] his hands underneath his
legs" and acted with increased nervousness.

R.186:14; R.187: 118,141-42.

Second, the officers in Baker testified that nothing in the occupants' behavior
gave them reason to fear for their safety. Baker, 2010 UT 18, | 50. In contrast,
Deputy Barrett testified that he was "concerned that the knife might be with Mr.
Gardner" based on "Gardner's nervousness[,] . . . [the driver's] weapons
historyf,] and [the presence of] an unknown knife in an unknown location."
R.186:14.
Gardner contends that the driver's history as a safety risk is irrelevant in
assessing whether he was armed and dangerous. See Aplt. Brf. at 15,17. But as
recognized by the United States Supreme Court, "a car-passenger... will often
be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest
in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing." Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,304-05 (1999). Accordingly, Deputy Barrett was right in
considering that fact in his assessment of the danger.
Gardner makes several other challenges, but all fail. He notes that Deputy
Day did not see him making any furtive movements, Aplt. Brf. at 17, but Day
was dealing with the driver—it was Deputy Barrett who was watching Gardner,
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see R.186:12, R.187:141-42. He asserts that Deputy Barrett would have seen him
conceal a knife because he was observing him continuously. Aplt. Brf. at 17-18.
But when Deputy Barrett "initially saw" Gardner, his hands "were between his
legs on the seat." R.187:142. As evidence that there was no reason to believe he
was armed and dangerous, Gardner points to the fact that he was cooperative
and told the deputy that he had no weapons. See Aplt. Brf. at 18-19. But an
officer is not required to accept a suspect's explanation at face value or even give
it any weight. See United States v. Buckner, 179 F.3d 834,838 (9th Cir. 1999). This
is especially so where the explanation is inconsistent with the suspect's
behavior, as here.
Gardner asserts that "[o]ther than exhibiting nervous behavior which
'increased when [he was told] the driver was being arrested,' there was nothing
about [his] conduct that made the officer believe he was 'being disruptive or
aggressive or threatening in any manner.'" Aplt. Brf. at 18 (quoting R.187:118
and State v. Lamond, 2003 UT App 101, f 20, 68 P.3d 1043). But Gardner's
increased nervousness at the prospect of the driver's arrest and the vehicle's
impoundment cannot simply be discounted. "[T]he risk of a violent encounter
in a traffic-stop setting 'stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist
stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more
serious crime might be uncovered during the stop.'" Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 787
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(quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,413 (1997)). "And the motivation of a
passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime is every
bit as great as that of the driver." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413; accord Johnson, 129 S.Ct.
at787.
Finally, Gardner claims that "even if the circumstances of the stop created
a reasonable suspicion, [Deputy] Batrrett mitigated the danger by ordering [him]
out of the vehicle." Aplt. Brf. at 15, 19. But ordering occupants out of the
vehicle "mitigates the inherent dangerousness" of the simple traffic stop, "where
other indicia of dangerousness are absent/' Warren, 2003 UT 36, ]f 27 (emphases
added). It does not sufficiently mitigate danger to officer safety when "other
indicia of dangerousness" are present. Indeed, because the knife referred to by
the driver had not been located, Deputy Barrett had every reason to believe,
given Gardner's hand movements and nervousness, that Gardner may have
concealed the knife on his person. His exit from the vehicle would do little to
mitigate the risk to the deputies' safety under these circumstances.
***

In sum, the facts available to Deputy Barrett at the moment of the
weapons frisk supported a reasonable belief "'that the action taken was
appropriate/" Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^ 14 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). In
any event, Gardner consented to the frisk.
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B. The weapons frisk was conducted pursuant to Defendant's
voluntary consent.
"A consent [search] is valid only if '(1) [t]he consent was given
voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of [a]
prior illegality/ " State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 47,63 P.3d 650 (quoting State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1262 (Utah 1993)). The consent search here satisfied
both requirements.
1. Defendant's consent to the weapons frisk was voluntarily
given.2
As noted, a consent to search must be "'freely and voluntarily given,,,/ i.e.,
the consent may "not be coerced, by explicit or implied means, by implied threat
or covert force." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222, 228 (quoting Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,548 (1968)). In short, the consent must be "'the product of
an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker/" Id. at 225 (quoting
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,602 (1961)). If it is, the consent is valid and
the fruits of the search are admitted. If it is not, the consent is invalid and the
fruits of the search are suppressed.

2

"Before a court addresses whether consent was voluntary, it must first
determine that there was consent," which is a factual finding reviewed for clear
error. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^f 48. Gardner does not challenge the trial court's
finding of consent, but the court's legal conclusion that it was voluntary,
claiming that it was in submission to coercive police authority. See Aplt. Brf. at
22-26.
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When relying upon the consent exception to justify a search, the
prosecution '"has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and
voluntarily given.'" Id. at 222 (quoting Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548 (1968)). As
explained by this Court in Hansen, "[t]he appropriate standard to determine
voluntariness is the totality of the circumstances, and the burden of proof is by
[a] preponderance of the evidence." 2002 UT 125, ^ 56, 63 P.3d 650.
Under the totality of the circumstances test, "a court should carefully
scrutinize both the details of the detention, and the characteristics of the
defendant."

Id. (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225). "[0]ne factor to be

considered in the totality of the circumstances" is whether there is "clear and
positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given." State v.
Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ]f 36, 227 P.3d 1251 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). While the existence of such testimony supports a finding of voluntary
consent and vice versa, "its presence or absence is not itself determinative." Id.
Other factors that may show a lack of duress or coercion include:
(1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers;
(2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; (3) a mere
request to search; (4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and
(5) the absence of deception or trick[ery] on the part of the officer.
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ]f 56; accord Tripp, 2010 UT 9, | 37. A review of all the
circumstances in this case establishes that Gardner's consent was voluntary.
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Deputy Barrett merely requested consent to search, "ask[ing] [Gardner] if
he minded 7 ' if he frisked him for weapons. R.186:14,19; R.187:70. There was no
claim of authority to do so, use of trickery, or an exhibition of force. Gardner
complains that he "was faced with the presence of four uniformed officers, one
of which was 'covering' [Deputy] Barrett, presumably meaning he was armed,
and two police dogs/' Aplt. Brf. at 25-26. But no such evidence was adduced at
the suppression hearing. See R.186. And in any event, only one dog was
deployed, and it was not deployed until sometime after Gardner's arrest. See
R.187:77-78.3 The record also demonstrates that only two officers — Deputies
Day and Barrett—were directly involved at the time, and nothing indicates that
in "covering" Deputy Barrett during the frisk, Deputy Day did anything more
than watch as the frisk was performed. See R.187:69-70.
Moreover, and as conceded by Gardner himself, see Aplt. Brf. at 20, the
evidence demonstrates that Gardner was cooperative during the encounter.
Officer Barrett testified that when he asked Gardner if he minded if he frisked
him, Gardner "turned around and raised his arms out." R.187:71. This was
"clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely
given." Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ^ 36 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
3

Deputy Barrett was the other K-9 unit, but nothing in the record suggests
that he ever deployed his dog. See R.187:69.
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Indeed, there was nothing ambiguous about Gardner's actions—they evidenced
unequivocal consent to the deputy's request to conduct a frisk.
Gardner relies heavily on an Illinois Supreme Court decision—People v.
Anthony, 761 N.E.2d 1188 (111. 2001). See Aplt. Brf. at 23-25. The facts here,
however, are distinguishable. First and foremost, the defendant in Anthony
"assumed the position of an arrestee: he spread his legs apart and put his hands
on top of his head/ 7

761 N.E.2d at 1193. Such nonverbal conduct was

ambiguous because it implied that Anthony believed he was about to be
arrested, not simply frisked. In contrast, Gardner assumed the position of a
frisk, with his arms simply raised. There was nothing ambiguous about his
actions. Moreover, Gardner was not subjected to "a series of subtly and
increasingly accusatory questions," as was Anthony. Id. Deputy Barrett simply
asked Gardner if he had any weapons or property and then asked Gardner if he
minded if he frisked him. See R.187: 70-71.
In any event, the decision in Anthony is questionable. The majority
opinion recognized that an individual "may convey consent to search by
nonverbal conduct." Anthony, 761 N.E.2d at 1192-93. And indeed, other courts
addressing the issue agree. See, e.g., United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858,863 (7th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 765-66 (10th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Chan-]imenez, 125 F.3d 1324,1328 (9th Cir. 1997). Yet, as observed by
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the dissent in Anthony, "[i]f . . . defendant's gesture in [that] case was
ambiguous, it is difficult to conceive of any nonverbal gesture, short of nodding
one's head in assent, that could be construed as unambiguous/ 7 761 N.E.2d at
1196 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Even then, a nod could be construed as

ambiguous. As discussed, Gardner's nonverbal conduct was even clearer than
Anthony's gesture. Were this Court to apply Anthony to this case, it would
"effectively eliminate[ ] nonverbal conduct as a means of conveying consent."
Id. The Fourth Amendment does not require such a result.
2. Defendant's consent was not obtained by police exploitation
of a prior illegality.
Gardner argues that even if voluntary, his consent was invalid because it
was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. See Aplt. Brf. at 26-29.
Specifically, he claims that he was unlawfully detained after he was asked to exit
the vehicle. See Aplt. Brf. at 27-29. Gardner concedes that he did not raise this
claim below and must therefore show plain error. See Aplt. Brf. at 27. He
cannot meet that burden.
In the first place, where there existed a reasonable suspicion that Gardner
was armed and dangerous, his exit from the vehicle was not sufficient to
mitigate the deputy's safety concerns. See supra, at 15. And in the second place,
Deputy Day was still in the process of completing the arrest and had not yet
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conducted the weapons search of the vehicle. As made clear in Johnson, "[t]he
temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains
reasonable, for the duration of the stop," which normally "ends when the police
have no further need to control the scene." 129 S.Ct. at 788. Until the deputies
had completed the arrest, including the vehicle search for weapons, there was a
need to control the scene and the stop was not at an end. Gardner has thus
failed to show any error, much less plain error.
***

In sum, the totality of the circumstances supports the trial court's
conclusion that Gardner voluntarily consented to the weapons frisk. Moreover,
that consent was not obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality.
II.
TESTIMONY THAT CERTAIN EVIDENCE WAS INDICATIVE
OF DISTRIBUTION WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED
In his second point on appeal, Gardner argues that the deputies'
testimony relating to distribution constituted expert testimony under rule 702,
Utah Rules of Evidence, and was thus subject to the formal notice requirement
of section 77-17-13(1), Utah Code Annotated (West 2004). Aplt. Brf. at 35-48. He
contends that because the prosecutor did not provide that notice, the trial court
erred in admitting the testimony and denying his motion for mistrial. Aplt. Brf.
at 34,48-50. He claims that the court's instruction to disregard Deputy Barrett's
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testimony as to quantity was insufficient to cure the alleged error. Aplt. Brf. at
48-50. This Court need not reach the issues raised by Gardner, but may affirm
the judgment of the trial court on the alternative ground that the prosecutor was
not required to give the subject notice.4
Subsection (1) of the expert notice statute provides that a party
"intend[ing] to call any expert to testify in a felony case at t r i a l . . . shall give
notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days
before trial." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(a). Subsection (1) notice must
include "the name and address of the expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and"
either a copy of the expert's written report, a written explanation of the expert's
proposed testimony, or notice that the expert is available for consultation. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-17-13(l)(b). Gardner argues that the prosecutor was required to
give that notice in this case and failed to do so. See Aplt. Brf. at 34. He ignores,
however, other provisions of the expert notification statute which rendered
subsection (1) inapplicable in this case.
The expert notice statute carves out two exceptions to its subsection
(1) notice requirement. Such notice is not required: (1) where the expert is an

4

This Court may affirm the judgment of the district court on alternative
grounds, so long as they are "apparent on the record" and "sustainable by the
factual findings" below. State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^ 9, 76 P.3d 1159.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-22-

employee of the State or one of its political subdivisions, or (2) where the expert
testified at the preliminary hearing. The State in this case was exempt from
filing subsection (1) notice under both exceptions.
1. The prosecutor was exempt from providing formal notice of
expert testimony under subsection (6) of the expert
notification statute.
Under subsection (6), the State is not required to provide subsection (1)
notice if its expert is a state or county employee and general discovery provides
the defendant with reasonable notice that the expert may testify:
This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an
employee of the state or its political subdivisions, so long as the
opposing party is on reasonable notice through general discovery
that the expert may be called as a witness at trial, and the witness is
made available to cooperatively consult with the opposing party
upon reasonable notice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(6). The State satisfied these requirements.
The deputies were employees of Salt Lake County, a political subdivision
of the State. See R.187:60,114. Moreover, general discovery placed Gardner on
reasonable notice that they would be called as experts at trial. Defense counsel
filed a discovery request soon after Gardner's initial appearance —almost one
full year before trial — seeking, among other things, identification of all
inculpatory evidence, a list of responding officers, copies of their reports, and a
list of witnesses the State intended to call at trial.

R.13-18. The record
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establishes that counsel received the police reports at least eight months before
trial. See R.186:10, 21 (defense counsel referring to police reports of Deputies
Day and Barrett at hearing on motion to suppress held eight months before
trial). Additionally, the State did not oppose the discovery request—as it did a
subsequent request for the criminal rap sheet of the driver in this case — and
Gardner never filed a motion to compel. See R.95-97. Accordingly, it can only
be assumed that all of the requested information was provided. 5
This discovery was more than sufficient to place the defense on notice that
the State would rely on the deputies' expertise alone to establish that the drugs
found on Gardner were intended for distribution.6 Any claim to the contrary is
belied by defense counsel's motion to exclude the testimony before trial even
began.

Before trial ever began, defense counsel demonstrated that she

understood that the State would be relying on the deputies' "training and
expertise" to testify as to the significance of the quantity of drugs, cash, numbers
of packages, and other evidence relating to an intent to distribute drugs. See
R.187:12-14. Counsel then attempted to exclude that evidence—before the State
5

The trial court also appears to have granted the State's discovery request
based, at least in part, on the State's compliance w ith Gardner's initial discovery
request. See R.55-63.
6

The State did provide subsection (1) notice of its intent to call a Utah
Crime Lab criminalist, but the notice made clear that his testimony would be
limited to identification of the drugs. See R.64.
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ever sought to introduce it. This course of action establishes that the discovery
provided by the State did, in fact, place Gardner on "reasonable notice . . . that
the [deputies] may be called as [expert] witness[es] at trial." Utah Code Ann. §
77-17-13(6).7 The State was therefore not subject to the subsection (1) notice
requirement.
2. The prosecutor was exempt from providing formal notice of
expert testimony under subsection (5) of the expert
notification statute.
Subsection (5) of the expert witness notification statute further provides
that an expert's testimony at a preliminary hearing satisfies the notice
requirement of subsection (1):
For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a
preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's
qualifications, and a report of the expert's proposed trial testimony
as to the subject matter testified to by the expert at the preliminary
hearing.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(5)(a). The preliminary hearing held on August 21,
2008 satisfied this provision.

7

Subsection (6) also provides that the witness must be "made available to
cooperatively consult with the opposing party upon reasonable notice/' Utah
Code Ann. § 77-17-13(6). Nothing in the record suggests that Gardner gave such
notice or that the State did not otherwise make the deputies available upon such
notice.
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The August 21, 2008 minute entry indicates that Gardner waived the
preliminary hearing. See R.19-20. A closer review of the record, however,
reveals that the entry is erroneous. In his motion to suppress, Gardner relied on,
and cited to, testimony from the preliminary hearing. See R.23-24. Moreover,
the November 20,2008 minute entry for the suppression hearing indicates that
Gardner's counsel "stipulate[d] to testimony at the Preliminary Hearing" for
purposes of his motion. R.42. And at that evidentiary hearing, defense counsel
cross-examined both Deputy Day and Deputy Barrett on their preliminary
hearing testimony. See R.186: 19-20, 28. The preliminary hearing, therefore,
satisfied this notice provision and the State was thus not required to file a notice
under subsection (l). 8
"k * "k

In sum, this Court need not reach the issue as to whether the deputies'
testimony concerning "intent to distribute" constituted expert testimony under
rule 702. Assuming, arguendo, that it was, the State was not required to provide
subsection (1) notice, because Gardner was placed on "reasonable notice
through general discovery the [deputies] may be called as [expert] witness [es] at
8

Section 77-17-13(5)(b) provides that "[u]pon request," the State must
"provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae" if it
called an expert at the preliminary hearing. Nothing in the record suggests that
such a request was made or that the State did not otherwise comply with this
provision.
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trial." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(6). Additionally, the deputies' testimony at
the preliminary hearing satisfied the notice requirements of section 77-17-13.9
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted August 18, 2010.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

JEFFREY S. GRAY

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

9

Even assuming, arguendo, that the State was required to provide
subsection (1) notice, exclusion of the evidence was not the appropriate remedy.
The remedy of exclusion only applies where the State acted in bad faith in not
providing the notice and nothing suggests that the State acted in bad faith. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(4). Gardner, therefore, was required to seek a
continuance, but did not do so. See id. And in any event, any error was harmless
given Gardner's statement to the deputies admitting that he was holding the
drugs for the driver in exchange for drugs —an admission that established
accomplice liability. See R.187:136.
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U.S. Const, amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (West 2004)
(l)(a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any
expert to testify in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a
preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the party intending to call the expert shall give
notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less than
30 days before trial or 10 days before the hearing.
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert,
the expert's curriculum vitae, and one of the following:
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed
testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate
notice to prepare to meet the testimony; and
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively
consult with the opposing party on reasonable notice.
(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible for any
fee charged by the expert for the consultation.
(2) If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole
or part on the results of any tests or other specialized data, the party
intending to call the witness shall provide to the opposing party the
information upon request.
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or
the information concerning the expert's proposed testimony, the
party receiving notice shall provide to the other party notice of
witnesses whom the party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's
testimony, including the information required under Subsection
(l)(b).
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially
comply with the requirements of this section, the opposing party
shall, if necessary to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a
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continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to
meet the testimony.
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this
section is the result of bad faith on the part of any party or
attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions. The
remedy of exclusion of the expert's testimony will only apply if
the court finds that a party deliberately violated the provisions
of this section.
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a
preliminary hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's
qualifications, and a report of the expert's proposed trial testimony
as to the subject matter testified to by the expert at the preliminary
hearing.
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the
preliminary hearing shall provide the opposing party with a
copy of the expert's curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior
to trial or any hearing at which the expert may be called as an
expert witness.
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is
an employee of the state or its political subdivisions, so long as the
opposing party is on reasonable notice through general discovery
that the expert may be called as a witness at trial, and the witness is
made available to cooperatively consult with the opposing party
upon reasonable notice.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

LOHRA L. MILLER
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
NATHANIEL SANDERS, 11281
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

MAR - 9 2009
By-

^ft

AKE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER
ON January 5th ,2009

-Va-

Case No. 081902472
DERRICK WADE GARDNER,
Honorable PAUL G. MAUGHN
Defendant.
On November 20th, 2008, the above-captioned matter came before this Court on
the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Those present were: the defendant, DERRICK WADE
GARDNER and Samuel Newton, the defendant's attorney, and Nathaniel Sanders, the State's
attorney. The defendant Has requested that this Court suppress evidence derived from the stop
and search of the defendant and his vehicle in the above listed case. The State and defendant
submitted motions, memoranda and oral arguments in support of their respective positions.
Based upon the evidence, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order regarding the defendant's request to suppress evidence.
FINDING OF FACTS
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds the following by a preponderance of evidence:
1. On March 23rd, 2008, Officers initiated a traffic stop involving the defendant.
2. The driver of the vehicle had a history of drugs and dangerous weapons.
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3. The driver admitted that there was/were knive(s) in the car.
4. The defendant acted with heightened nervousness upon being asked to exit the vehicle.
5. At that time the knife had not yet been located.
6. Deputy Barret asked to frisk the defendant and the defendant raised his arms and turned
around.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes the following:
1. Knowledge of the driver's history with weapons, the driver's admission that there
was a knife in the vehicle and the defendant's nervousness justified the Terry frisk.
2. By raising both arms and turning around, the defendant gave sufficient indication of
consent to the search.

ORDER OF THE COURT
1.

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Evidence.

DATED this

5

day of

~)»4

:,

2009.

PAUL G. MA
Third District ^aage

APPROVED AS TO CONTENT AND FORM.
Robert Engar, Attorney for Defendant
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